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On the Faculty of Intuition
Oliver P. Waite
University of Vermont Department of Philosophy

Abstract
The topic of this paper is an investigation of intellectual intuition as a faculty of the human mind.
The aim of this investigation is to draw a strong analogy between the faculty of intuition and the
various faculties of empirical sense (vision, hearing, and so on). I begin by examining the
phenomenology of intuition, highlighting the similarities between the subjective experience of
intuition and empirical sense. I explain these similarities by arguing that both activities are alike
in being presentational mental activities. Developing the concept of a presentational activity in
general, I examine the relationship between presentations and beliefs formed on the basis
thereof. I argue that beliefs based on intuition and sense perception enjoy prima facie
justification proportional to the quality of that presentation. After explaining how beliefs formed
on the basis of intuition can err, I spend some time distinguishing intuition-based beliefs from
sense-based beliefs by underscoring the a priori and immaterial nature of intuitions. It turns out
that this difference is key to explaining how intuition serves an exalted role in the production of
philosophical knowledge. In particular, I argue for a modest epistemic foundationalism in which
intuition and sense perception both provide non-inferential justification. After explaining why
philosophical knowledge is especially concerned with a priori knowledge, I concur that intuition,
in being the only immediate ground for a priori knowledge, must serve as the foundation of all
philosophy. Finally, I argue that this theory of intuition is capable of protecting philosophy from
certain skeptical scenarios in which knowledge might be thought impossible.
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Introduction
Having served as the cornerstone of philosophical systems and as something to be avoided at all
costs, the nature and purpose of intellectual intuition is a question with which philosophy as a
discipline has been occupied since its inception. The continued interrogation of this subject is the
task of the present work. It is divided into two chapters, which can be thought of as responding to
the nature and the purpose of intuition in turn.
In the first chapter I develop the notion of presentational mental activity to postulate a
similarity between intuition and sense perception. Such a comparison is neither novel nor
outlandish, but in this work the analogy is both made explicit and strengthened. Owing to their
shared status as presentational activities, intellectual intuitions and sense perceptions analogize
both phenomenologically and epistemologically. Though there are critical differences (which are
discussed at length in the final section), I argue that intuition and sense perception are much
more alike than most previous authors suggest. Importantly, the way that both activities relate to
belief mean that they are both the sort of thing which can ground knowledge. But, as I argue, the
knowledge grounded by either intuition or perception is neither infallible nor incorrigible. There
are many commonly accepted ways that empirical senses are said to err, from the optical illusion
of the submerged stick to drug-induced hallucinations, and I posit that these phenomena have
their analogies in intuition as well.
The second chapter uses the epistemology developed in the first to assert that the nature
of philosophy is such that it necessitates the use of intuition—despite its fallibility—and that all
philosophical knowledge is ultimately beholden to intuition. I support this claim with the
development of a modest foundationalism in which the inferential knowledge is grounded by
non-inferential knowledge, which is in turn grounded by presentational activities (i.e. by
intuition and sense perception). Subsequently, I show why intuition, as capable of giving a priori
knowledge, enjoys a privileged status among all methods of non-inferential justification as far as
philosophy is concerned. The final task of the paper is to show that, given everything theretofore
developed, intuition is capable of providing an escape from certain scenarios of radical
skepticism in which knowledge might be thought impossible.
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A full exploration of the consequences of the epistemology developed in this paper is not
possible due to its limited scope. Therefore here I wish to explain some future projects or
theories made possible (in whole or in part) by the machinery I develop in this paper.
First, there are some implications for moral realism that 'fall out' of my picture of
intuition. This is because intuitions about moral propositions (which are very common) are in
this model intuitions about propositions about the universe, which seems to imply that the
universe is in possession of moral properties (and that the contrary notion, that morality is
somehow invented or purely subjective, is false). Although I treat these issues somewhat in the
second chapter when dealing with an objection, the moral realism above suggests certain
metaphysical assumptions or implications of this picture. Intuition as I describe it seems to
require its proponent defend some form of dualism or even idealism. Because I am not prepared
to do this here, I would only gesture toward this demand and make the connection between the
epistemology, the ethics, and the metaphysics plain.
Additionally, these results could well be applied in the philosophy of mathematics. In
mathematics everything happens within axiomatic systems—essentially a fancy way of saying
all math is the result of very basic assumptions. But questions about which of these assumptions
are true are often circumvented through the use of language like "reasonable" or "believable."
This leads to some disagreement on which axioms, and consequently which results, are true; in
other words, which results describe the universe and which are merely speculative. In providing
a foundationalist epistemology I provide a way to determine the (prima facie) truth of axioms
handed to mathematicians by intuition. Though it is unlikely to solve the conflicts created by
disagreements in the "believability" of axioms, since these conflicts are themselves typically the
product of conflicting intuitions, it can at the very least explain how these conflicting intuitions
are possible.
If nothing else, however, the aim of this paper is ultimately to demystify intuition and
show that it is a fruitful wellspring for (analytic) philosophical investigation. There are many
philosophies and philosophers that seem to dismiss intuition out-of-hand as something which is
not capable of being rigorously specified and described. I think that this position is antiquated
and stems from the positivist current which took hold of philosophy during the twentieth century
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whose consequences are still being dealt with. I maintain, contra the positivists, that not only is a
priori knowledge possible but that the elucidation of this knowledge through intuition is the
central aim of philosophy. Thus in some sense I see this present paper as laying the groundwork
necessary to begin philosophizing.

6

Chapter I: Intuition
§ 1 Introduction
This chapter is a discussion of the nature of intuition. With this first chapter, I endeavor to
answer the questions "what is intuition?" and "when and how does intuition provide
knowledge?" These being somewhat vague and demanding questions, this chapter is partitioned
into several sections. The opening section is devoted to the phenomenology of intuition, and will
discuss what it is like to have an intuition. I develop this account in parallel with the adjacent
mental activities of sense perception, relying heavily on analogy. The results of this
phenomenological inquiry result in a great deal of similarities between sense perception and
intuition, and thus in order to highlight why intuition in particular enjoys a distinguished role in
epistemology I take some time to explain how intuition and sense perception are quite different.
All of this leaves room to develop an epistemic theory of intuition, and in particular to determine
if and when intuitions can be reliable sources of knowledge. Along the way it will be important
to determine to what extent this theory of intuition commits the account to certain metaphysical
or meta-philosophical claims, and examines the plausibility of those claims where committed.
With objections of this kind disposed of, the intention is to provide a reasonably fertile ground
upon which the next chapter can flourish.
What is it like to have an intuition? When one speaks of intuitions, one will say
something like "it struck me that thus-and-so was true" or "suddenly it seemed to me that
such-and-such could not be otherwise" or "I knew this-and-that immediately." It therefore seems
pre-theoretically that an intuition consists in the apprehension of a proposition, and a secondary
apprehension or evaluation that the proposition is true. Additionally, the apprehension of the
truth of the proposition is non-reflective and immediate. The apprehension of truth at the same
time strongly disposes one to believe the proposition at hand. In common parlance, one speaks of
the experience of an intuition as an instance of "seeing as true."
I maintain, contrary to what one might expect, that intuition is a rather benign constituent
of the manifold of experience. It is something most people take for granted: moral intuitions, for
example, serve as the sole justification for most moral beliefs, while low-level mathematical
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intuitions are simple enough that one can expect them in any primary school classroom. Even
more fundamental intuitions about the necessity of the laws of nature seem to be the only thing
allowing one to proceed through life with a relatively high degree of confidence and sanity. It is
not particularly shocking to have an intuition, and intuitions are so commonplace that it is
miraculous that they remain relatively unanalyzed in philosophy while other mental phenomena
are the subject of such high levels of scrutiny. It is also troubling because there are many dogmas
of philosophy that either rule out, dismiss, or fail to address the possibility of knowledge
grounded in intuition. Part of the reason for these failures is the want of a thoroughgoing and
comprehensive account of the phenomenology of intuition. In this section, I aim to rectify that.

§ 2 What Intuition Is Not
Though I have already provided a primitive positive definition of intuition, it is better to begin
with a negative one. There are many adjacent phenomena with which intuition is often confused
or conflated. Distinguishing from these adjacent phenomena will also reveal some positive
properties of intuition.
Something with which intuition is often confused is latent belief. Latent beliefs are
beliefs which one ostensibly possesses but which are not currently before the consciousness.
Suppose during an introductory course on logic I form the belief that "'p or not p' is a valid
principle of inference." While I am in class, this belief is at the front of my mind, as it is required
in many of my proofs; I have to attend to this belief frequently. When I cease to perform formal
logical deductions on a regular basis, this belief slips from my mind. But several semesters later,
I take a class on advanced logic. When during the first class the principles of inference are
reintroduced, one might be inclined to say that I re-form the belief that "'p or not p' is a valid
principle of inference" by the same mechanism that caused it to be formed in the first place. But
it seems more appropriate to say that I recalled the belief I already possessed, or re-attended to
the latent belief. The reason that this recollective process or direction of attention is often
confused with intuition is because intuition often provokes both the formation of the belief and
its recollection; it was an intellectual seeming that "p or not p" was true that caused me to believe
that it is a valid principle of inference, and it is the same seeming that provoked me to remember
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my belief. It makes sense to call beliefs that were formed in this way intuitive beliefs. But
intuition can be distinguished from intuitive beliefs in two ways. First, the intuition appears prior
to the belief when describing the history of conscious mental activity, as it is the intuition which
causes t he formation or recollection of intuitive belief. Second, the intuitive belief, once formed,
persists even when the intuition is not present and even when the consciousness does not attend
to the belief. It is not necessary that every time I invoke the law of excluded middle in my proof
that I experience an intellectual seeming that "p or not p" is true. This argument for the
distinction between intuition and latent belief can be extended more generally to a distinction
between intuition and belief qua belief. Intuition may aid in the formation of belief or allow one
to believe, but in such cases the intuition of the proposition is not itself the belief in question.
But having distinguished intuition from belief, there is yet another mental process with
which intuition is mistakenly identified: the disposition to believe. Following Bengson1 this
confusion can be resolved through separation of dispositions to believe from intuitions by
showing that each can take place without the other. To illustrate how an intuition might not cause
a disposition to believe consider the following case:
Headstrong Heraclitian
One day Hermes comes across Heraclitus delivering an address to a crowd. As
Heraclitus is an excellent orator, Hermes is captivated. During the course of the
speech Heraclitus provides a convincing argument that the principle of
non-contradiction is false. Later on, when Hermes reflects on the principle of
non-contradiction, he finds that it strikes him as true, but his encounter with
Heraclitus has instilled in him a disposition to believe its negation. Though it
appears to him as true, Hermes trusts the wisdom of Heraclitus more than his own
and so dismisses this seeming as illusory.
Cases like the Headstrong Heraclitian are common in everyday life. Through reason and
experiment it is quite easy to form dispositions and beliefs counter to intuition. These practices
need not completely remove the dispositional power of intuition, since absent the convincing
reasons, the disposition to believe will realign with the intuition. What is important about this

1

John Bengson. "The Intellectual Given." Mind, vol. 124, no. 495, 25 May 2015, pp. 707–760.
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case is that the statement "I have an intuition that p" does not imply "I am disposed to believe p."
To see why the reverse implication fails as well, consider another case:
Effete Ethicist
Professor Felix is appointed to an end-of-life committee to determine if a patient
should receive euthanasia. Because he is rather bored by the details of the
complicated case he does not have any judgement by his own lights, and so
resolves to flip a coin and write a defense of whatever the coin rules. Because he
is an excellent writer, he is convinced by his own argument and is inclined to
agree with his own arbitrary argument.
In such a case, it is possible to form a disposition to believe when there is no intuition present at
all. Again, this is a common occurrence. Many of the things about which persons have
dispositions to believe require too much intellectual labor to comprehend and so it is impossible
to consider them, let alone form an intuition about them. But this is precisely what leads to the
confusion of intuition with disposition to believe. In ordinary language something is 'intuitive'
precisely when it requires little cognitive investment to understand, and hence when one is easily
disposed to believe things about it.
An additional mental phenomenon from which intuition must be distinguished is
revelation. Though intuition and revelation are alike insofar as they are both mental events that
impart some kind of content which is presented as true, there are two major points of
differentiation which are often overlooked. The first is the reliance of a theory of revelation on
the concept of the revelator—the entity doing the revealing. If this entity is supernatural or divine
in any way then the theory must make certain theological claims, and in so doing becomes
subject to any number of skeptical or learned theological objections. The second difference (an
advantage a theory of intuition has over a theory of revelation) is that intuition is not mystical or
obscure in the way revelation is. Not many people frequently have revelatory experiences, but
almost everyone frequently experiences intuition. It is mostly for this reason that I leave the topic
of revelation here undeveloped and reorient the discussion.
Distinguishing intuitions from latent beliefs, dispositions to believe, and revelations
potentially raises more questions than it answers. For it is clear that while intuitions are not
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themselves beliefs or dispositions thereto, they are certainly involved in the formation and
maintenance of beliefs. Thus a complete account of belief requires one to examine the
relationship between belief and intuition more closely. Therefore with the remainder of this
section I will develop a positive account of intuition which strongly suggests this relationship
with belief.

§ 3 Intuitions as Presentations
The pivotal insight in recent work on intuition2 is creating an analogy between intuition as a
"rational seeing" and the faculties of the empirical senses. This manoeuvre is important not only
because it gives a plausible phenomenology of intuition that makes sense of such experiences,
but it also provides an epistemological framework upon which a real theory can be built. The
question of epistemology, however, is the task of the next section. The remainder of this section
will focus on constructing and defending the perceptual analogy. The central move that Bengson
makes in formulating the perceptual analogy is his theory of presentations.3 Although I make use
of much of this theory (which is essentially a move of abstraction to observe a formal thing
which is common to empirical sense and intuition), I depart from Bengson in a few significant
ways to make room for an even more general concept which is applicable to a wider range of
mental activities.
My aim is to show that the analogy between sense perception and intuition is strong
enough that each step in the causal chain for sense perceptions has a corresponding step in the
causal chain for intuition. Therefore what is desired is some kind of "rational eye" that takes
intellectual content from the outside world4 and converts it into something which is meaningful
to the subject, with this in turn initiating some sort of inner motion. I take for granted the
existence of the "rational eye" as the faculty of understanding, though I would maintain that
any person is capable of the introspection necessary to find this faculty within oneself if he is not

2

It is of course true that intuition has been placed in analogy with perception since Plato and this thread was carried
through to the rationalism of Descartes and beyond. An actual explanation of and development of the analogy was
rather lacking, however, and as far as I can tell only in the 21st century has this idea really been taken seriously in
the analytic tradition.
3
Bengson, Op. cit.
4
At least initially.
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already convinced it is there. I also generally avoid the "initiation of inner motion" because it
seems that the entire process is "inner motion" in a formal sense. Just as the engagement of the
eye in sense perception is actually a mental activity (insofar as the eye is a part of the nervous
system) capable of causing further mental activity (i.e. the formation of perceptual beliefs), the
engagement of the faculty of the understanding in intuition is also a mental activity capable of
causing further mental activity (i.e. the formation of belief from intuition). In both cases it seems
as if there is mental activity going on at all stages and so to inquire how inner motion can occur
in intuition is to inquire how it can occur at all, which is well beyond the scope of this work.
With these goals in mind, I begin with Bengon's definition of presentations.
Presentations are mental activities which possess content and present that content as
"being so." Bengson gives five important characteristics of presentations: they are baseless,
gradable, non-voluntary, compelling, and one is disposed to rationalize their content. Briefly, this
means that: presentations are not consciously formed on the basis of other mental states; that the
quality of presentations can vary in different situations; that one is passive in the face of
presentations; that one is compelled to believe in the content of presentations; and that one is
compelled to justify those beliefs with reason and the intellectual faculties.5 I accept these criteria
but only hesitantly. In this section, I aim to provide a more general account of what counts as a
presentation and thus a presentational mental activity, which will warrant a re-examination of
these criteria. If Bengson’s position that intuitions are like sense perceptions in being
presentational activities is "quasi-perceptualist," my more radical position might be called a
"full-throated-perceptualist" account insofar as I extend the analogy with sense perception further
than him. In order to understand how I extend Bengson’s analogy it is first necessary to
determine some things about the beliefs which perceptions and intuitions both serve.
It is rather uncontroversial6 to assert that beliefs are representational mental activities,
and that if a subject S b
 elieves P, then S represents P. But here there is already some ambiguity:
to what or to whom is P represented? This point of confusion hides itself when one couches
mental activity in the language of mental states, and the elucidation of this point in particular is
5

Ibid., pp. 720–723.
Though uncontroversial, the claim "beliefs are representational mental states" is seldom given a theoretically
convincing defense. My own motivations for accepting this claim lie in a psuedo-Reinholdian analysis of the
relational structure of representation, though proper treatment of this issue would take me too far afield.
6
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another motive for preferring the active characterization. It is not as easy, however, to answer
this question as it is to ask. The most natural answer would be that S represents P to himself.
This certainly captures the idea of mental representation; that a belief about P i s constituted by
mental activity simulating P. But this position is derelict when it comes to supplying the
connection between this internal mental activity (if it even occurs at all) and other attributes of
belief. In particular: the affective components of belief, the components of belief that compel a
subject to (external) action,7 the notion that beliefs are metaphysically or ontologically distanced
from a subject,8 how beliefs can be shared amongst subjects,9 and the relation between belief and
its objects. Rather than S representing P t o himself, I posit S represents P to the universe U. The
universe to which S presents P is, to use some mathematical terminology, the domain of thought,
which might be understood canonically as logical space or set of all possible worlds. Because I
do not wish to be burdened by the conceptual baggage such ideas might carry, I stress the
important characteristic of the universe is that any proposition one can formulate is about the
universe or something ‘contained’ in it.
This analysis of the representational character of belief allows one to formulate a general
schema for a certain pair of relations:
Schema I (presentation-representation):
Some universe U presents P to some subject S, and S represents P to U. 10
This schema makes sense of what goes on during both sense perception and intuition. While the
subset of the universe about which one forms sensory beliefs and about which one forms beliefs
through intuition can be radically different from one another, this language captures the idea that
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If a belief is a purely "internal" representation then any motivation or affect created by that belief would also seem
to be purely internal. But this is not what it feels like to be motivated by (or affected by) belief. Such affectations
and motivations feel external, and so it is important to connect the external objects of belief with their
representations in a way that can explain this phenomenon.
8
Here, I mean to capture the idea that even if a subject undergoes a change of (individual) beliefs, the metaphysical
identity of the subject is unchanged, but that the subject seems to be metaphysically identifiable only by its mental
activity.
9
Certainly you and I both believe "squares have four right angles" but given that I do not have mental pictures and
thus cannot see a square when reflecting on this proposition almost guarantees that we do not represent it in the
same way. Likewise someone with no mental pictures who does not speak English represents the proposition in yet a
different way. But one is compelled to say that in all three cases we share the belief "squares have four right angles."
10
It is worth noting that this schema does not rule out the possibility that some proposition Q different from P might
be represented by the subject in response to the presentation he experiences. There are many confounding factors
and thus many explanations as to why this can occur, as I shall explore later.
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in both cases there is some content or information external to oneself that one is accessing by
engaging the correspondent faculties. Before moving on, it is advantageous here to contrast my
account with Bengson's in order to highlight the gaps that this new way of framing the issue fills.
The first problem arises when Bengson describes a classification of mental states which
places "presentational" and "merely representational" states under the shared type of
"representational."11 He explains this classification by asserting that during an intuition, "it is not
simply that one is in a state that represents the world as being such that [P] is true. One has the
impression that it is."12 I will object on two counts. First, the framing of the discussion in terms
of mental states rather than mental activities ignores the active character which is essential to the
presentation relation. Second, this way of treating the issue assumes that during a presentational
mental activity there is representation by the subject; moreover, that the presentational activity is
constituted of this representational mental activity and the property of 'having the impression.'
Though I will explain precisely why this is erroneous, it is important to briefly address how the
first error leads to the second and why I therefore conceive of the mind as manifold activities
rather than as manifold states.
The reason that thinking of representation and presentation as states rather than as actions
is misguided is because there is no theoretical mechanism available to Bengson that allows
distinguishing between a belief (or generally, a representation) and an intuition (or generally, a
presentation) that does not involve the introduction of further mental states or activities. If
representation is merely a state, it is much harder to speak about the agents who are performing
the action of representation and the objects (or agents) which receive that representation. Thus
treating representations as states limits discussion only to their content and their 'situatedness'
(i.e. in whom the representations occur and under what circumstances). The conjunction of these
two facts is what admits the confusion found in Bengson. In Bengson's picture, it is impossible to
ask the central motivation question for this investigation: "to what or to whom is P represented?"
(The answer to this question forms what I call the direction of the mental activity, a concept
which I will return to later.) If one ignores the active characteristics of representation (and
presentation), and considers the direction-free mental activity in either, one will find that a belief
11
12

Bengson, Op. cit., p. 7 18.
Ibid., p. 719.
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that P and an intuition that P appear identical. They both contain the same content, and are both
situated in the same subject. Therefore presentation and 'mere' representation are both types of
representation which can be distinguished only by the presence of the additional mental state of
'having the impression.'
I find this unconvincing. Bengson distinguishes 'having the impression' from 'being under
the impression' as a way to justify his introduction of the former as a criterion for a mental state
being presentational. For Bengson the difference lies in whether a proposition is actively
presented to as opposed to endorsed by the subject.13 But this merely gestures at the distinction in
question: it does no explanatory work as to how it comes to be that one can have the impression
that some propositions are true while being merely under the impression that others are true.
Furthermore, I claim that the state of 'having the impression' is actually a consequence of—rather
than a constituent of—presentational mental activity. It is in no way characteristic of the
phenomenology of the presentation that one has the impression. It is a presentation that P which
causes one to have the impression that P, and it is not even a necessary consequence thereof.
This subtlety is better illustrated through analogy with the empirical senses.
Spacey Seeker
Lizzie has lost her keys and is searching all over the house. Although they are on
her kitchen table, and she has looked at the table a great many times in her quest,
she has not noticed that the keys are there. It is only when her roommate points
out the keys are on the table that Lizzie becomes aware of the fact.
Though in such a case Lizzie has ostensibly "seen" that her keys are on the table—insofar as she
has the sense data of her keys and the sense data of the table simultaneously as her gaze was
directed toward them—she has not attended to this sight and is thus epistemically neutral with
regard to the proposition "the keys are on the table." In such a case Lizzie is presented with this
proposition but does not have the impression that the proposition is true.
One may contest this point by arguing that in such a case there is no presentation
occuring—that Lizzie has seen nothing if she has not attended to it; in other words, one could
claim that what Lizzie is doing is not ‘true seeing.’ But this is at odds with both the subjective

13

Ibid., p. 717.

15

phenomenology and other empirical phenomena. Call the mental activity in the Spacey Seeker
case "mental activity A. " There are two ways that one could object to calling mental activity A
‘true seeing’: one could say that mental activity A is not presentational (and thus does not count
as presentational mental activity), or one could say that 'true seeing' (or the paradigmatic visual
experience) consists of "attending to" in conjunction with some mental activity A.
The first route seems entirely unconvincing. Even if attention is removed from the
picture, the characteristic features of presentations are still present: information of the same type
enters the visual sensorium and has the potential to inform further mental activity. In a case like
the Spacey Seeker, Lizzie is still presented with but merely unresponsive to this information. To
say that there is no presentation occuring at all is simply wrong.
Though the second response seems initially more plausible, it also fails. If the
paradigmatic visual experience is "attending to"14 plus mental activity A, then one must
investigate and describe mental activity A in order to have a precise account of the visual
experience.
But mental activity A (which occurs in the case of the Spacey Seeker) seems a lot like the
phenomenon of blindsight. Blindsight is a phenomenon observed in the cortically blind (which is
to say, people whose blindness is caused by damage to the visual cortex of the brain). Of
particular interest in such patients is that the eye itself and the ocular nerves which connect the
eye to the brain are still functional. This means that the eye is still receiving and transmitting
sense data, even though the subjects are not aware of it. Though cortically blind patients do not
have the subjective experience of seeing, they are able to react to stimuli as if they were able to
see.15 There are some subtleties here about different types of blindsight, but the general idea is
that patients who experience blindsight have visual information affect their behaviours without
this visual information becoming conscious. This is similar to what is occuring in the Spacey
Seeker case because information enters the brain of the blindsight patient but does not reach the
level of consciousness or awareness. There are obviously some differences insofar as that

14

One might also wish to replace "attending to" with "being conscious of" in this paragraph. I adopt this language
mostly to draw parallel with the Spacey Seeker example, though I believe it still captures the essence of what is
going on during blindsight.
15
For more on the phenomenon of blindsight, see Gastone G. Celesia, "Visual Perception and Awareness: A
Modular System." Journal of Psychophysiology, vol. 24, no. 2, 2010, pp. 62–67.
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information cannot enter the level of consciousness in the blindsight patient, but this potentiality
is unimportant for the analogy.
Between blindsight and the Spacey Seeker one can extract a working definition of mental
activity A: "visual information entering the mind without its becoming conscious." So if one
allows for the equation of "becoming conscious of" and "attending to," one is left with a
definition of mental activity A: " visual information entering the mind without its being attended
to." But remember the definition of seeing was supposed to be mental activity A plus "attending
to." So it becomes clear this circumlocution has done nothing at all—describing mental activity
A without making reference to sight is impossible, and any definition of mental activity A is
formally equivalent to 'seeing without attending to.' So to say that something like blindsight does
not count as 'true seeing' is ad hoc and untenable. These cases suggest that it is better to conclude
attention is not a necessary part of the paradigmatic visual experience, and that the paradigmatic
visual experience is instead what I have been calling mental activity A. It was in fact mental
activity A that was the presentational mental activity all along, and is the subject of the current
investigation. For this reason I am motivated to call mental activity A 'seeing' and will refer to it
as such throughout the rest of this section. That said, because seeing can occur with or without
attention, I will refer to seeing as 'seeing without attending to' or 'seeing with attending to' as the
discussion requires.
So with this in mind allow me to finally return to Bengson's description and show why
"having the impression" is not a necessary part of presentations qua presentations. Although
Lizzie and the blind-seer both see, they see without attending to. Because they are not attending
or cannot attend to their seeings, neither is capable of forming conscious beliefs about the
content of their sight. Thus it does not make sense to say that either has the impression that the
content of their sight is true. Importantly, even if the content of their sight informs behaviour, it
does so at the level of the unconscious or subconscious mind. Because both having and being
under the impression require that one is aware of some content, both of these activities occur at
the level of the conscious mind. Therefore even if Bengson's criteria are capable of
distinguishing presentational mental states from merely representational mental states, it is only
the conscious versions of these states to which these criteria apply.
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But as I have just shown, there are at least two ways that one can see without being
conscious of (i.e. the Spacey Seeker and blindsight), and I think it is not controversial to assert
that there are more such examples in the visual as well as the auditory, olfactory, gustatory,
proprioceptive, vestibular, and somatic senses. That examples exist even in intuition as well
remains to be demonstrated, and this point will be dealt with somewhat in the subsequent
sections. In any case, that there are unconscious "merely representational" mental states is also
uncontroversial; "believing without attending to" is an everyday phenomenon and probably the
most common mental activity there is.16 This means that there is a category of presentations that
are unconscious as well as a category of representations that are unconscious. So again, even if
Bengson's criteria do distinguish between conscious presentations and conscious beliefs, they
cannot apply to unconscious presentations and unconscious representations and therefore cannot
apply in any generality to presentations qua presentations and representations qua
representations.

§ 4 Presentations as Directional
Despite this lacuna in Bengson's account, this discussion has made the path to understanding
presentational mental activity much more navigable. What a phenomenology of presentations
must actually do is explain the activity analogous to seeing without attending to (i.e. the
presentational activity) and distinguish this activity from 'believing without attending to' (i.e. the
representational activity). I maintain that this distinction can be made by analysis of the bare
phenomena of presentation and representation alone in lieu of the introduction of attention. The
key which unlocks this strategy is the concept of the direction of mental activity.
For mental activities which contain propositional content, the concept of direction helps
to elucidate the source of the content, or whence the mental activity has its origins. The
relationship between the directional from and an epistemic grounding will be explored in detail
in the next section, but it is sufficient for now to simply say that the content of a mental activity
16

To understand what is meant by 'believing without attending to,' reflect on the proposition "there are twelve inches
in a foot." Though you certainly believed this before you read it, it was not before your conscious mind and you
were not attending to it. Some authors call this phenomenon latent belief, and contrast it with occurrent belief.
Though I think this distinction both accurate and useful, it is not strictly necessary to develop my account of
presentations and thus I will do no more than mention it.
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reflects a reality contained in the location from which it originates. The other aspect of the
mental activity that direction captures is its end, or toward17 what the activity is directed. This
can be in the form of either an agentive recipient or a non-agentive location upon which the
content is impressed. In order to completely determine the direction of a mental activity one must
therefore describe both the 'from' and 'toward' aspects of the activity. To support this definition
with and to provide the foundation for the subsequent sections I will analyze the direction of
three distinct mental activities: presentation, representation, and imagination.
Bengson claims that presentation is characterized by being non-voluntary and baseless. I
agree, and assert that because of these two characteristics a subject passively receives
presentations. There is neither a sense in which I can "turn off" my eyes nor a sense in which I
can "turn off" my rational eye. Because of this the will plays no part in the mental activity of
seeing or of intuiting, or generally of presentation.18 The direction of the mental activity of
presentation is toward-subject. The easy question is "what is the presentation 'from' if it is
'toward'-subject?" The answer is that it is from the universe. The very notion of a presentation is
that it contains content; and anything which can be predicated as content is contained in the
universe. According to the two-part definition of direction that I have given, the direction of
presentation is from-world-toward-subject.19
Representations on the other hand are active on the part of the subject (even if
unconscious). There is some element of the will involved when the subject accepts or believes a
proposition (or if the representation is unconscious, when the subject continues to accept or
believe upon becoming aware of it). The direction of the mental activity of representation is
therefore from-subject. Again, the obvious question is "what is the representation 'toward' if it is
'from'-subject?" The answer here is slightly more subtle, but broadly speaking, it is always
'toward' the universe. Representation, however, being active, can have its direction altered by the
subject. It might be more specifically directed (e.g. toward my father to whom I am speaking,
The use of "end" suggests a similarity with telos. This is not entirely accidental. The concept of direction is in
some sense aimed at discovering the purpose of the mental activity, and so thinking of direction in these terms is
completely reasonable.
18
Though the will certainly does play a role in the process of understanding t he content of the sensorium.
19
For fear of treading too much into a theological territory, I will leave this issue here by saying that it is not really
that surprising that the universe should have some agentive properties—after all, you and I are part of the universe
and we have agentive properties.
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toward the chalkboard on which I am writing, &c.) depending upon how the content is
represented. But no matter the specific target of representation, it is vacuously true that it is
directed toward the universe, since anything toward which it could be directed is something
which the universe contains. If one wishes to remain with the two-part definition, the direction of
representation is from-subject-toward-world.
The reason that both aspects of direction are necessary is because the concept can be
applied to mental activities beyond presentation and representation. Consider the phenomenon of
spontaneous imagination, or the unprompted creation of novel concepts and syntheses thereof.
As the content of imaginations appear before the rational eye they are evidently toward-subject.
But the will is unquestionably involved in producing that content and thus imaginations are also
from-subject. While it is possible to convey or communicate the contents of one's imagination
via representational activities, the imaginations themselves cannot be shared between subjects.
So the subject at either end of imagination is the same. Thus imaginations can be classified as
from-subject-toward-subject.
Based upon the foregoing, it would be natural to posit the existence of a fourth activity
occupying the direction of which is from-world-toward-world. While I think this is completely
reasonable, it would take some serious work to argue that such an activity is mental, since the
mind in question for the previous three activities is the subject on either end of its direction. It
would thus apparently not be of the right species for my concept of direction to apply, and so I
will abandon further discussion.20
It is worth pointing out that the direction of a mental activity greatly informs the
phenomenology of an experience. By experience, I simply mean subjective mental activity
possessing content. Two such activities possessing the same content but distinguished by their
direction correspond to two completely different experiences under normal circumstances. It is
quite easy to differentiate between one's imagination of a square and one's actually seeing a
square, because a subject is (under ordinary circumstances) aware that the imagination is subject
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To posit this fourth activity as mental requires one to further flesh out the concept of the universe I introduce
above. If one understands the universe as God, then it is possible to attribute more subjective properties to It. Under
these assumptions, I think it would be fair to say that the set of from-world-toward-world activities would just be
"events" in the sense of "something that takes place." But to dwell on these things too much again leads one into the
territory of theology and probably belongs to a work other than this.
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to his will and that he could imagine it otherwise. The 'feeling' of actually seeing a square is
completely different from this, one is aware that one is subject to the contingencies of the
external world. It is worth remarking, however, that not all circumstances are normal and as a
philosopher I am especially concerned with the abnormal circumstances. Consider for instance
the things one experiences while dreaming. In a dream, the content of one's experiences seem to
come from outside of one's mind, and it is difficult to tell, while dreaming, that one is indeed
dreaming.21 This is why dream skepticism has been so gripping a hypothesis from Augustine's
Confessions to the Wachowskis' The Matrix. But whether or not the sensory or intuitive
experiences one has while dreaming count as true instances of their corresponding conscious
phenomena, dream actions can be distinguished from their conscious counterparts by observing
that the manifold of dream-experience is generated entirely by the dreaming mind.22 This
subtlety is important for the more in-depth discussion of dream skepticism given in the seconds
chapter.
Even when the mental phenomena are subjectively indistinguishable they still possess
different directions and thus are in fact different from each other. The same is true even when
there is no subjective awareness of or attention paid to the mental activity under scrutiny.
Therefore with the concept of direction there is an external criterion that can be applied to
distinguish between various types of contentful mental activities. But perhaps more important
than allowing one to distinguish mental activities which possess the same content is that the
concept of direction can be deployed to explain why some mental activities are the sort of thing
capable of justifying belief and others are not. In particular why intuition and sense perception
can justify belief while imaginations and dreams cannot.

Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 17. Sosa actually suggests that it is
impossible to determine that one is dreaming while one is dreaming because the act of determination is itself not
possible while dreaming—one rather dreams that one determines. This subtlety is rather important to his argument
but less so to mine.
22
Of course, echoing the previous, it is not necessarily possible to draw this distinction in the first person, while
dreaming.
21
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§ 5 The Epistemological Advantage
The essential advantage of this rather complex framework for understanding presentational belief
is that it clarifies why presentational beliefs—in particular those given by intuition and sense
perception—are candidates for knowledge, while others—spontaneous imaginations, for
example—are not. If P is the content of some presentational state, the reason a subject is prima
facie j ustified in representing P is precisely that in doing so he is in some sense responding
symmetrically to his experience of the presentation whose content is P. There is no such
symmetry in the case of a spontaneous imagination.23 This symmetry is essential to the character
of presentational beliefs. To abuse a metaphor, when one is struck that such-and-such must be
the case, one is justified in 'striking back' in equal fashion. Following Bengson, the justification
one enjoys in this case is only prima facie; there are many places for error in judgement or
defeating considerations to enter, as I shall soon discuss. For now, I conclude:
Proposition I (re-presentationalism):
Given that the action of presentation relates some universe U to some subject S by
the content of that presentation P, S is prima facie justified in re-relating himself
to the universe U by the selfsame content P, or re-presenting P to U (i.e. believing
or accepting that p).
The natural responses to such a proposition are questions as to how strong the justification is.
Since the proposition applies presentational beliefs (which include both sensory and intuitive
beliefs), the answers to questions along these lines should also sensibly apply in either case. In
particular, any factors that influence the strength of justification should be present in both sense
perception and intuition. Therefore it is reasonable to examine the features common to both and
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If I conjure images and stories in my head, and invent characters about whom I can make claims, I will certainly
form beliefs, but will in no sense generate meaningful knowledge. But when I write "Johann is 1492 years old" after
imagining something to this effect, I have put something in to the universe which you are now capable of
experiencing through visual or auditory presentation, and of representing in belief. When I decide, however, that
Johann is in fact only 1487 years old, it will undermine both the truth value and the justification of your belief,
because I am the source or grounds for that belief. This is to be contrasted with statements like "squares have four
right angles," which are necessarily true (i.e. independent of the whim of any particular subject). I claim that
statements like these are grounded by ‘the universe’ as above, or God as the Universal Subject, or some such thing.
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determine if they play a role or should play a role in strengthening or weakening the justificatory
power of the presentational experience.
One of the features which Bengson and I both claim that presentations possess is
phenomenological gradability.24 The criteria according to which a presentation can be graded
include vividness, forcefulness, clarity, and other such things. This is no doubt easily granted in
the case of sense perception; the clarity of my visual experience lessens when I remove my
glasses and improves when I put them back on. Though there is no tool in analogue with my
glasses for intuition, the principle can be extended. Another situation in which the grade of a
presentation can decrease is when one's attention is directed elsewhere. With perceptual
experiences, as with intuitions, if one can carefully examine the content of those experiences one
will consequently be more clear than if one was, as in the case of the Spacey Seeker, distracted or
hasty. The grade of a presentation, formulated in this way, affects the justificatory force of the
presentation in an obvious way. The clearer or more vivid the seeming, the more weight it will
carry in the formation of belief. In Bengson's words, "the gradability of presentations may
ground a corresponding gradability in prima facie justification,"25 which is precisely what was
desired. With a bit of formalism:
Lemma I (gradability):
The strength of the justification S has in believing or accepting P by virtue of
Proposition I is proportional to the phenomenological grade of the presentation
relation.
Again, though, this justification is only prima facie. Given that an upshot of Proposition I is that
this justification is immediate and non-discursive, there is no action needed on the part of the
subject other than simply having an intuition to receive the full justification for whatever
proposition one intuits. Furthermore, the character of intuitions is non-sensory, i.e. rational and
intellectual. Intuitions thereby qualify as a source of a priori justification.26 Being a source of
prima facie justification though, this allows the possibility that the content of an intuition is not
ultima facie justified. Thus the grade of the justification awarded by the grade of the presentation

Bengson, Op. cit., p. 7 21.
Ibid., p. 743.
26
According to any reasonable definition of a priori a nd a posteriori at least.
24
25
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is important only insofar as one considers countervailing reasons to reject the intuition, or in
other words, is open to the possibility that intuitions can be erroneous. I have already given one
example in the Headstrong Hericlitean o f a subject electing to form a belief counter to his
intuition, so it seems that the possibility of error should remain open if the theory is to correctly
describe actual belief-formation processes. This is perhaps surprising given the historical
prevalence of the notion that 'a priori justified' and 'certain' are one and the same; this is certainly
the impression one has from reading Plato or Descartes.

§ 6 Error in Intuition
So what sorts of considerations are capable of overriding the justification that intuition provides?
The answer to this question is that such considerations are many. On the one hand, there is the
obvious answer that any countervailing reason can count against an intuition. In the Headstrong
Hericlitean c ase, testimony plays this role, but one can imagine many things that would make
one consider his intuition untrustworthy: pre-existing beliefs, a lack of confidence in one's
intellectual abilities, thoughtful reflection on the concepts at hand, &c. But these are all
subjective considerations; considerations that the subject in whom the intuition occurs is
responding to. In a manner of speaking, these are all psychological rather than philosophical
considerations. To illustrate the difference, consider the following case:
Opposed Ontologists
Suppose Dr. Smith and Dr. Jones are both learned philosophers debating the
nature of reality. Dr. Smith has the intuition that the universe is deterministic, and
Dr. Jones that it is indeterministic. Both claim to have a very clear intuition (i.e.
of a high grade), and neither is convinced by the other's paper in defense of his
intuition; they are always able to object to one point or another.
In this case, neither philosopher has a strong enough subjective reason to reject his intuition. But
they cannot both be right, nor can they both be wrong. In other words, something must be
interfering with the process of intuition that introduces error despite a subjective unawareness of
this fact.
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The most obvious source of error, and one suggested by the similarity with perception, is
illusion. The Müller-Lyer illusion, for example, consists of one's seeing lines of the same length
as different. Even when made aware that the lines are in fact commensurate, one is often unable
to elect to see them as such; the content of the visual presentation remains the same. Eventually,
once one is familiar enough with the illusion one will recognize the lines as being the same
length, but this is a second-order cognitive activity and not one which is a part of the
presentational activity. This sort of illusion has a very strong analogy in intuition. Consider the
axiom of unrestricted comprehension in mathematics: "for any predicate ϕ there is a set whose
members satisfy ϕ."27 At first glance, this axiom seems true, since one would expect that given a
predicate, one can collect all of the objects satisfying that predicate, especially when the objects
are limited to something simple like sets—it is one of those things that simply presents itself as
being true once the requisite definitions are understood. But this axiom is manifestly false as it
implies Russell's paradox.28 Like the Müller-Lyer illusion, even when the falsity of the axiom is
demonstrated one cannot help but intuit that for any predicate ϕ there is a set whose members
satisfy ϕ; the second-order recognition of its falsehood is not a part of the process of intuiting.
Even when well-familiar with the axiom it still maintains its truthful appearance, just as the lines
of Müller-Lyer appear to be different lengths. There are plenty of explanations that one can give
as to how intellectual illusions are possible (just as there are plenty of explanations for optical
and auditory illusions). Though I wish to avoid speculation here, one of the simplest explanations
is that some concepts (like that of "set" and "predicate") are more complex and subtle than the
understanding can grasp 'all at once,' so the mind is vulnerable to err when these types of
concepts are involved. But the reason for intellectual illusion is not as important as the existence
where this discussion is concerned; all that must be demonstrated here is that such illusion does
occur.
The second source of error in intuition is a lack of attention. Such scenarios are
reminiscent of the Spacey Seeker case. Though Lizzie would not testify to having seen the keys
on the table, they were there, and her eyes did pass over the table. She merely failed to attend to
Bengson, op. cit., p. 719.
Let R be the set of all sets who are not members of themselves. Then R is a member of itself R if and only if R is
not a member of itself. There are many avenues to the resolution of this paradox but all of them involve the rejection
of the axiom of unrestricted comprehension.
27
28
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the presentation at hand and hence did not notice that her keys were indeed on the table.
Likewise a lack of attention can prevent one from intuiting the truth (or falsehood) of
propositions which would otherwise be obvious. This is probably most common in mathematical
computation, where, for example, one might hastily see something like "44 + 66 = 100" and
mistakenly endorse it. Errors of this kind are such that, when pointed out, one will typically
notice the mistake one has made, will no longer have the intuition (or lack thereof) which caused
the mistake to be made in the first place, and will be able to see the cause or reason that
inattention gave rise to the error. It is much the same for errors of inattention in the empirical
senses. As soon as Lizzie is made to realize her keys are on the table she will notice that she was
not looking at the area where they were very carefully, and so on.29 A similar second-order error
is that of misrecognition. When a passerby on the street is mistaken for an old friend, for
example, it is only upon closer inspection that the truth is revealed. But if a belief is formed on
the basis of this misrecognition, it will be in error for the time it is possessed. In particular if no
closer inspection is able to take place, this belief will persist in its error for some time. The
analogue in intuition is a misrecognition of concepts. An example of this in the moral sphere
might be in one's mistaking "wrong" and "evil." Arguably, an action can be wrong—insofar as
there are (morally) better alternatives available—without thereby being unqualifiedly evil. But
sometimes in these cases the wrongness of the action strikes one so profoundly that one mistakes
this appearance of wrongness for evilness. Moreover, this misrecognition can be so powerful that
it requires extensive philosophical argument to establish the distinction which caused the error in
the first place (as might be the case with the concepts of wrong and evil).
But it seems like none of the sources of error discussed thus far properly explain what is
going on in the Opposed Ontologists case, where two people experience mutually contradictory
intuitions despite paying close attention and being well-acquainted with the necessary concepts. I
think that this case (and its many real-world analogues) is explained by the existence of
intellectual hallucinations. A hallucination consists in having an experience which is
subjectively identical to a presentation but which is in reality an imagination; this is usually
framed as the perception of stimuli which are not present. Sensory hallucinations are a
29

Errors of this kind frequently occur in auditory sensation as well, where one might mistakenly hear one's name or
the name of a close friend in a distant conversation.
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well-documented and extensively studied phenomenon in empirical psychology, and are a
familiar source of error for many philosophical thought experiments.
That hallucinations can be wholly cognitive or intellectual is suggested by the existence
of so-called "command hallucinations." These are hallucinations which consist in the subject
experiencing a voice which directs them to act in a certain way. Command hallucinations are
noteworthy because they can occur both as an auditory hallucination, i.e. as a subjective
hearing—which is sensory—or as a cognitive hallucination, i.e. as a subjective 'inner voice,'
which is of a purely perceptual, intellectual character. That a hallucination can be of a purely
intellectual character makes possible the existence of intellectual hallucinations (that is to say,
hallucinations of intuition). Since command hallucinations are intimately connected with belief,
in particular the subject's beliefs about the voice giving the command, this gives even more
credence to the idea that they are meaningfully involved with the intellect.30 Though the
existence of command hallucinations is not itself sufficient evidence for intellectual
hallucinations, that command hallucinations are conceptually articulated and informed by belief
does gesture toward this phenomenon. The investigation of intellectual hallucinations, however,
is something which is much more difficult than the investigation of sensory hallucinations. Since
it is impossible for a third party to verify or corroborate the contents of the intellectual
sensorium, it seems that the only way to establish that an intellectual hallucination is occurring is
to be convinced (through philosophical argument) that the proposition intuited is false,
impossible, or contradictory. Therefore even if intellectual hallucinations are a common source
of error they are not able to be subjectively recognized (after the fact) the way other types of
error are.31 Nevertheless I think that the general phenomenon of 'seeing something which is not
really there' explains what is going on for one of the subjects in the Opposed Ontologists case,
and that this type of error is responsible for much of the dichotomous disagreement in
philosophy.
A. Beck-Sander, et al. “Acting on Command Hallucinations: a Cognitive Approach.” The British Journal of
Clinical Psychology, vol. 36, no. 1, 1997, pp. 139–48.
31
It is worth pointing out that this is also the case with sensory hallucinations, absent the presence of other people;
one might be able to, for a drug-induced hallucination, reflect and realize that one was seeing things which were not
actually there (in the past tense). But this sort of reflection is only possible for temporary hallucinogenic states. If
they are caused instead by damage to the brain or illnesses of the psyche, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
recognize hallucinations as such.
30

27

§ 7 Distinguishing Intuitions and Perceptions
According to this directional framework though, both intuition and sense-perception are alike in
being presentational, which is to say they are alike in being contentful mental activities with the
direction from-world-toward-subject. This means, as I have already argued previously, the
phenomenology of an intuition is very similar to the phenomenology of sensory experience. It
also means, as I shall develop shortly, the epistemology of intuition is very similar to the
epistemology of sensory experience. But in order to understand why intuition serves a role in
philosophy which is distinct from that of perception,32 which is the task of the next chapter, one
must distinguish these mental activities from each other.
The first and most obvious way that intuition is unlike perception (and that the different
modes of perception are unlike one another) is in the sort of justification which each provides.
Intuition is, properly speaking, an a priori faculty; the justification given by intuition is a priori,
and intuition counts as a faculty of reason for this purpose. Sense perceptions, on the other hand,
are empirical; the justification they give is a posteriori. (This is why intuition is given a
privileged epistemic position over the senses, since it alone among presentational activities is
capable of giving to the consciousness a priori k nowledge.)
Another important distinction arrives upon noticing that the faculties which correspond to
the acquisition or production of presentational mental activities are qualitatively different in
sense perception and intuition. The faculties of sense are made possible by physical, material
organs:33 the eye for visual presentations, the ear for auditory presentations, the nervous system
for proprioceptive presentations, and so on. Furthermore, sensory presentations are caused by
physical and chemical affectations of the corresponding organs upon the brain (the existence of
hallucinogenic drugs evidences this point well).34 By contrast, intuition does not have this
In particular, why intuition is not just 'another type of sensory perception' or a 'nth sense' but is rather elevated to a
foundational status in epistemology.
33
Physical or material in this sense is meant to describe something which possesses both extension and mass (i.e. the
eye both takes up space and is composed of matter). More generally only one of these characteristics is necessary for
something to be considered physical, and even more generally something which is able to be explained (in actuality
or in potentiality) by natural science.
34
An additional consideration here is the use of electrical shock to create hallucinations of various types, as in
Kajimoto, Hiroyuki "Illusion of Motion Induced by Tendon Electrical Stimulation." 2013 World Haptics Conference
32
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physical component. Even if one identifies the brain as the conduit for thought it clearly does not
analogize with the physical senses properly; there is no 'intuition receptor' of the brain which
receives proposition-data and presents it to the mind. This is of course because propositions do
not propagate through physical space the way that light, sound, smells, &c. do. Rather, the ability
of sensory information to carry concepts and activate cognitive faculties is auxiliary or
secondary; this is precisely what is illustrated by the Spacey Seeker case in the previous section.
Though Lizzie undoubtedly has the image of the key and the image of the table and their
compresence presented to her by her eye, she does not draw the conceptual link between the key
and its image and thus cannot be said to have the thought that her keys are on the table. Even
when propositions are embedded in physical space by the use of language and symbols, it is not
as though they are carried by the impressions made by such symbols. In the Spacey Seeker case,
one can find a way in which the activity of sight is divided into two separate sub-activities: the
presentational and the cognitive. By subtracting the cognitive element of seeing the true nature of
visual presentations is revealed. But such a subtraction is not possible for intuition. One could
just as well imagine that Lizzie saw the arrangement of symbols "1 + 2 = 3" written on the table
and in her haste to find the key thought nothing of it. This would be another example of seeing
without cognizing. On the other hand, it is incoherent to imagine Lizzie grasping the proposition
"1 + 2 = 3" and thinking nothing of it, as grasping the proposition "1 + 2 = 3" involves thinking
of it. It is impossible to find an example of intuiting without cognizing.
This difference could be explained by appealing to the function of the eye; the eye alone
does not do any cognitive processing, it merely conveys visual information free of interpretation.
Intuition, on the other hand, is conducted only by the rational eye or the faculty of the
understanding. Thus it is inextricably linked to cognition. It is impossible to have a concept-free
or cognitively inert intuition because an intuition presupposes the activation of cognitive
faculties; intuition is itself a cognitive activity.35 Without a cognition of the concepts involved an
intuition would be comparable to reading a sentence written in a language one does not speak. It

(WHC), 2013, pp. 555–558 (in this case kinesthetic), or in Kumar, Gogi, et al. "Olfactory Hallucinations Elicited by
Electrical Stimulation via Subdural Electrodes: Effects of Direct Stimulation of Olfactory Bulb and Tract." Epilepsy
& Behavior, vol. 24, no. 2, 2012, pp. 264–268 (here they are of smell).
35
It is another issue entirely whether intuitions (and somewhat by extension thoughts) are therefore necessarily
linguistic.
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neither makes sense to say such a sentence was read nor to say an uncognized intuition was
thought. It is worth pointing out that this is completely consistent with the idea that there are
unconscious or subconscious intuitions and intuitions that have not been fully attended to (just as
there are unconscious or subconscious sensations and sensations that have not been fully
attended to). Much of the cognitive activity of day-to-day life occurs at the subconscious level
(for example, ironically enough, the recognition of objects in the visual field).36 Therefore it does
not seem very radical to suggest that there are analogous activities where intuitions are
concerned.
The non-conceptual nature of sensory presentations means that the content which is able
to be delivered by the senses is drastically different from the content which is able to be
delivered by intuition. By "content which is able to be delivered" I mean the objects of
presentations as they exist in the world. The objects of sensory presentations are precisely
that—physical objects or phenomena caused by those objects. Intuition, on the other hand,
conveys propositions and other logical objects. There are many reasonable and natural concerns
regarding the dualism that this separation of the physical from the cognitive seems to
presuppose. In fact, this has historically been one of the more controversial aspects of intuition as
a reliable or valid ground of knowledge. Precisely because the objects of intuition are wholly
logical, they are immune from the sorts of verification and falsification that the empirical
sciences subject themselves to. Further, in a case of conflicting intuitions, there is no
independent verification possible. Because intuition possesses this non-physicality it has
completely different failure modes from the physical senses. While visual presentations might be
unreliable because the eye is malfunctioning, there is no analogue with intellectual presentations:
it is only a cognitive defect which can generate error in intuition. These cognitive defects can of
course take many forms; a misapprehension of concepts and a misrecognition of thoughts both
result in a subject having a mistaken intuition but in very different ways; a more substantive
discussion of this point is given in a later section as it requires the epistemology be fully
developed to treat correctly.
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I claim that this recognition is subconscious because when I look out my window and see the image of a tree I do
not thereby have the conscious thought "there is a tree outside" but nonetheless would be able to, when prompted,
avow such a belief without taking another look outside (though I may for psychological reasons wish to).
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The quintessential difference between sense perception and intuition is demonstrated by
the existence of something like eyeglasses. Someone who is nearsighted has in his sensorium an
unreliable and inaccurate picture presented to him by his eye. With the aid of glasses, he is able
to actively improve the quality of presentations available to him.37 Compare this to the practice
of using blinders (though typically for horses, sport shooters will wear them during
competitions). This device does not so much improve the content which is presented to the
subject, but rather by removing or making trivial some of the content on the periphery of the
visual field it can help one to see more accurately by narrowing one's attention. This practice, the
removal of parts of the sensorium also is able to improve one's cognitive functioning and
especially to improve one's cognitive perception (i.e. intuition and imagination). During the
practice of meditative visualization the most important step is to close one's eyes. Doing so does
not actively improve one's capability to imagine but rather by removing the complicated visual
content presented by the eye it allows one to focus more on the creation of one's own images.
While blinders can aid both the faculties of intuition and sense perception via the manipulation
of the sensorium, there are no 'rational eyeglasses' which can actively enhance the content of the
intellectual sensorium presented in intuition.
As rational eyeglasses are unavailable one might wonder how intuition can be refined or
sharpened, if at all. The use of blinders in the previous analogy can shed some light on the role of
attention in enhancing the apparent quality of presentations, and certainly there exist strategies
for directing one's attention to better focus on the cognitive elements of consciousness. In
addition to attention-related methods, the practice and exercise of the senses is capable of
enhancing their capability. This is not necessarily due to a qualitative increase in the content
delivered by the sensory organs, but more likely a harmonization of the sensory faculties with the
cognitive faculties.38 It seems reasonable to claim that the same sort of thing is possible with
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A hearing aid functions the same way for auditory presentations, but I am not aware of devices in analogy with the
other senses.
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This is particularly evident in the case of something like reaction time, which although decaying naturally with
age, can be improved through training: Samira Anderson, et al. "Reversal of Age-Related Neural Timing Delays
with Training." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, no. 11, 2013, pp. 4357–4362. This is
ostensibly an improvement in the cognitive dimension of hearing, insofar as the ability to recognize and react to
auditory stimuli is cognitive. Intuition, on the other hand has only this cognitive dimension and so it is reasonable to
assume that cognitive training methods are capable of enhancing the intuitive faculty in a similar way (aiding in
recognition response times, for example).
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intuition. In philosophy especially, the use of thought experiments or "intuition pumps" in
dialectic is something very much taken for granted, but this practice is something which is
possible only because there is a certain amount of familiarity with the practice that one acquires
from a great deal of exposure. Intuition is also (contrary to the physical senses) something which
one greatly improves with age precisely because of its cognitive nature. Even if a young child
has exactly the same capacity, his ability to have meaningful intuitions is significantly lower than
someone who simply has a wider base of knowledge and larger conceptual repertoire (i.e. has
more objects which he can intuit). This is especially true in the moral realm, where even when
children do have concepts of right and wrong those children cannot be trusted with moral
judgements. Though there are many reasons for the practice one is that children simply lack the
moral intuition to recognize right from wrong when faced with novel circumstances. Since
intuitions are conceptually articulated, possessing (being aware of, understanding, knowing)
more concepts means there are more things available to intuit.
This point naturally gestures at the final important distinction between intuition and the
physical senses, one which turns out to privilege intuition greatly. In order to have a sense
perception of some thing or another, one is required not only to have the correct faculties
working properly but also that one is in the right place at the right time. In order to see the Eiffel
Tower one must have been in Paris after the year 1889; in order to have heard Fichte lecture on
"the vocation of man," one must have been in a particular classroom at the University of Jena in
the summer of 1793.39 The scope of things able to be perceived by the senses is thus extremely
limited by the situatedness of the subject. Intuition insofar as it deals in concepts is not
constrained by the particular situation of the subject. Theoretically speaking, any concept is
capable of appearing in an intuition of any subject so long as the subject understands the
definitions involved. Of course, there are many more practical limitations to intuition given that
many concepts are far too complex to be understood 'at once' by most subjects; an intricate proof
of the fundamental theorem of Galois theory or a teleological argument for the existence of God
are not the sort of thing which can be intuited by normal subjects under normal circumstances.
The upshot of this, though, is that if there are concepts which are simple enough they have the
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potential to be universally available to intuiting subjects. By contrast, no empirical phenomenon
is universally perceivable. So if one is charged with grounding the knowledge of any subject, as
is the project of epistemic foundationalism, it seems as though one is forced to rely on intuition
since its content is uniquely capable of universalizing across all subjects.
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Chapter II: Foundationalism
§ 1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the purpose that intuition serves. Thus this chapter builds
upon the first by applying the theory just developed to concerns about the foundation of
philosophical knowledge. It is necessary to show that this theory of intuition can insulate
relevant knowledge from skeptical concerns, and in doing so it should become clear that this is a
role uniquely filled by intuition; other accounts of the foundation of philosophy cannot provide
reasonable responses to the skeptics. But to begin this demonstration one must first come to a
proper understanding of what philosophical knowledge consists of.
While I could provide a list of philosophical disciplines and subdisciplines that would
align with the current academic practices in order to explain what counts as philosophy and
philosophical knowledge, it is more revealing to provide a criterion or method of determining
whether some piece of knowledge is philosophical. Following Kant and the late moderns, I
contend that the project of philosophy is part of the project of science. By science, however, I do
not simply mean facts empirically reasoned according to somewhat arbitrary methods of data
collection and observation, but rather knowledge which is related, organized, and systematized
into a coherent and rationally compelling whole.40 Thus in addition to there being a science of
physics and a science of chemistry, there is also a science of epistemology, a science of ethics,
and so on. What distinguishes a philosophical science from other kinds of science, however, is its
being a priori.
The philosophy which I am concerned with here is not merely about whether some action
is right or some proposition is knowledge, but instead seeks the criteria for determining which
actions are right or which propositions count as knowledge. Such universal considerations ensure
that philosophical enquiries are a priori; no experience or set of experiences alone is capable of
providing satisfactorily universal criteria.41 This universality which is characteristic of
Immanuel Kant. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Translated by Michael Friedman, Cambridge
University Press, 2004. p. I.468.
41
This does not mean every philosophical proposition is completely a priori however, as judgements of aesthetics or
rules of ethics can be applied to particular, empirical cases quite easily. Additionally, it may be from these empirical
40
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philosophy is the cornerstone upon which any scientific philosophy is built. That one is even able
to discover or create formulae that are universally applicable for disciplines such as ethics and
aesthetics is itself a concession not so easily made. With this in mind, in order to conduct fruitful
philosophical investigations at all one must first ground the science of science itself, or in other
words, to ask how it is even possible to generate and organize bodies of knowledge in this
manner.

§ 2 Intuition as the Foundation
In order to understand why, in the words of Fichte, "intellectual intuition is the only firm
standpoint for all philosophy"42 it is important to contextualize such a claim within philosophy as
a whole as well as within foundationalism in particular. To do so requires an understanding of
classical versus modest foundationalism. According to foundationalism there is some collection
of elementary or atomic beliefs which are non-inferentially justified upon which all other beliefs
ultimately rest. Such a belief is called foundational. Classical foundationalism, which is the
foundationalism of Fichte, Kant, and Descartes, maintains that these foundational beliefs are
certain, self-evident, necessary, or otherwise infallible. The set of these beliefs can greatly differ
in scope and size: some philosophers rest their entire epistemology on a single belief43 while
others allow non-inferential justifications of many kinds to bestow the property of foundational.44
The alternative position is commonly called modest foundationalism. It is called modest usually
because it does not require the infallibility of foundational beliefs and therefore typically allows
a wider set of beliefs to count as foundational. A modest account usually frames the issue by
arguing that certainty is not necessary for a belief to be a candidate for knowledge.45
examples that the general universal principles are abstracted through other a priori means like induction or formal
deduction.
42
Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). Translated by Peter L. Heath and John Lachs,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. p. I.446.
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E.g. Descartes and his "cogito ergo sum." See René Descartes. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First
Philosophy. Trans. Donald A. Cress. Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.
44
E.g. Aristotle and his νοῦς. See Aristotle. De Anima. Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, Penguin Books, 1986.
These days it is more controversial to suggest that Aristotle is a classical foundationalist. See e.g. Breno Andrade
Zuppolini. "Aristotle’s Foundationalism." Revista Dissertatio De Filosofia, vol. 44, 2017, p. 187.
45
An historical example of modest foundationalism can be found in Thomas Reid. Thomas Reid: Selected
Philosophical Writings. Edited by Giovanni Grandi, Imprint Academic, 2012. Modest foundationalism on the
whole, however, is a position which has come into prominence much more recently.
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Both types of foundationalism have historically been supported by the regress argument
which first appears in Aristotle.46 The argument goes as follows: knowledge must be grounded in
some demonstration whose conclusion is the belief in question, and that such a
demonstration—in addition to being logically sound—must contain premises whose contents
count as knowledge. Thus if the premises of the initial demonstration are knowledge they must
also be grounded in some demonstration whose premises are themselves knowledge, and so on
ad infinitum. This gives rise to a quadrilemma. The first possibility is that this regress continues
forever, and that, since reason cannot proceed through an infinite series of demonstrations,
knowledge is not possible. Second, the regress terminates in some initial premises, these
premises cannot be demonstrated, and hence these premises are not candidates for knowledge;
thus no knowledge is possible. The third possibility is that at some point this regress becomes a
circle, and hence that all knowledge is demonstrable (i.e. a demonstration can be furnished for
any knowledge). The fourth possibility is that the argument is flawed, or "that not all knowledge
is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate [premises] is independent of
demonstration."47 This is Aristotle's own position, and it is a foundationalist one. But even
accepting Aristotle's reasoning, there remain open two questions: first, whether the regress
argument supports the classical or the modest foundationalist picture; and second, how any
knowledge can be independent of demonstration at all.
To answer the second question, I would appeal to the first chapter of this paper. Earlier, I
showed that presentational activities are capable of immediately grounding the knowledge of
their contents. As discussed Proposition I, a subject is prima facie justified in responding to the
presentational mental activity with a corresponding representational activity, i.e. belief. As
presentations are the only activity which affords this symmetry, they are unique among the
mental activities heretofore discussed in giving this justification. Imaginations cannot ground
knowledge (except second-order knowledge about the content of the imagination) since the
source of the content is the imagining subject, and beliefs (in particular, other knowledge) can
ground knowledge but not foundationally. Thus it is perception, whether empirically in sense or
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Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. Translated by G. R. G. Mure, The Internet Classics Archive, 2009.
Ibid., 72b18
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intellectually in intuition, that can provide the immediately justified knowledge to satisfactorily
resolve the regress quadrilemma.
As far as the type of foundationalism warranted by the regress argument, Alston argues
that it is only modest foundationalism.48 To do so he argues that classical foundationalism must
both establish the existence of immediately justified non-inferential knowledge and the
immediate justification of that immediate justification. In other words, classical foundationalism
would have to guarantee that no argument was capable of defeating the immediate justification
provided by the sensory experience or intuition. But as I have shown, both the senses and
intuition are capable of error and thus this is an impossible task. So in summary, a modest
foundationalism in which the foundational a priori knowledge is granted by intuition and the
foundational a posteriori knowledge is granted by the senses.
But the immaterial and a priori nature of intuitions is something which is highly
contested and the cause of much skepticism in philosophy. This manifests itself in what I call the
objection of subjectivity. Though the objection of subjectivity is not wholly characterized by its
protestation from the materialist or positivist angle, it is certainly informed and colored by these
positions. BonJour neatly summarizes the objection: "a priori philosophical argument cannot tell
us about independent reality, but only about our subjective … concepts. "49 Though "argument"
is the target of the objection it applies to non-discursive methods of justification as well, and
hence intuition comes under attack. BonJour himself is sympathetic to the idea of intuition (or as
he calls it, rational insight), and so he is also hostile to this objection of subjectivity. Despite this,
he does not provide what I would consider a satisfactory response, arguing instead that the
distinction between our concepts and the world (and hence the objection) simply does not make
much sense. As I see it there are two more substantial responses that one can give, both of which
are ontological in nature.
First, there is the idealist reponse, which can be seen as a reductio ad absurdum. This line
would argue that a priori a nd a posteriori arguments (and also non-discursive methods of
justification) are alike in that they 'are only about subjective concepts.' According to the idealist
William P. Alston. "Two Types of Foundationalism." The Journal of Philosophy. vol. 73, no. 7, 1976. pp.
165-185.
49
Laurence BonJour. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification. Cambridge
University Press, 1998. p. 150.
48
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picture, all experience—both sensory and intellectual experience—is mental, and hence reality
itself is purely mental. There are many forms and variations that philosophers have made to this
central hypothesis, but this is the primary commitment an idealist makes. The idealist response
completely removes these concerns of subjectivity, or rather, it circumvents them. By rejecting
the premise that the concern of subjectivity is limited to a priori arguments and justifications, the
objector is forced into a skeptical scenario, and thus forced to doubt all knowledge of the
supposed independent reality. But this would force the objector to abandon the belief that a
priori arguments cannot give knowledge of independent reality. In order to have any further
hope, therefore, the objector must furnish an argument against idealism. Thus the idealist
position turns an epistemological question about the reliability of knowledge which is purely a
priori into a metaphysical question about the nature of reality. It is a purely sociological fact
however that those inclined to make the objection of subjectivity are not likely to be in favor of
metaphysical idealism.
The realist response is much more likely to persuade someone who is inclined to the
objection of subjectivity but comes at the cost of being more sophisticated. Thankfully both the
objection of subjectivity and the realist response have deep roots in the tradition, and can be
found together in the Summa Theologica of St. Aquinas. After formulating the objection,50
Aquinas replies thus:
On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image
is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by
50

Aquinas Develops the objection as follows:
"Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as
that which is understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the
intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted
intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.
Obj. 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in
something outside the soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood.
Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid
intelligible species.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words are signs of the passions in the soul." But words
signify the things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the
soul—viz. the intelligible species, are what is actually understood."
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition. Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Project Gutenberg, 2006. I, Q. 85, Art. 2.
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which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually
understood, but that by which the intellect understands.51
While not so plain as the idealist response, this also makes certain metaphysical claims (for
Aquinas, these claims are stated and supported in many of the earlier articles in the Summa) .
First, that "intelligible species" represent an object which exists external to the subject. This
means not only that the various properties that physical matter appears to possess by means of
the senses (e.g. sweetness, hotness, blueness) exist as objects, but also that the various
propositions grasped by the understanding in intuition have existence external to the subject. So
there is a heavy burden undertaken by the realist in order to explain how this is possible; in short,
how something like "good" or "an arbitrary triangle" can exist as an object outside of the mind of
the subject without resorting to idealism. This is essentially the "problem of universals" as the
medieval philosophers understood it. A plausible response on the part of the realist is commit
itself to a sort of substance52 dualism,53 according to which the universe consists of both physical
and non-physical or abstract foundation. But there are plenty of other solutions to this problem
which do not commit themselves to dualism and hence many ways to continue the discussion
from there. In any case I have shown that the objection of subjectivity can be massaged into the
problem of universals, which might be a more compromising ground on which to debate.
I think that both the idealist and the realist responses have merits, but it is also possible
that the objection of subjectivity does not need to be taken seriously. Consider what is being
advanced by the suggestion that no a priori justification can give knowledge of independent
reality. Is not this claim itself both a priori and about independent reality? It certainly must be a
priori insofar as it is universal, and it is about independent reality insofar as it pertains to the
content (in this case, the knowledge) of a mind in general and hence of other minds. So unless
the objector is committed to a solipsistic picture of the universe in which he is the only mind and
only he can possess knowledge, he is speaking complete absurdities. If he continues to insist that
the claim is not about independent reality, but is instead 'merely about the concept of
51
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independent reality' and 'merely about the concept of knowledge,' he is only playing a game on
words in which everyone loses. In this case any truth in philosophy is a mere accident of
whatever definitions one chooses to accept for the concepts at hand. But since that choice
depends primarily on a priori means (that is to say, on intuition), one would never be able to
assert that any of one's true beliefs count as knowledge, no matter how internally consistent or
perfectly coherent one's system of belief. Therefore the most reasonable response to the objection
of subjectivity is to say that the claim is 'only about the concept of a priori justification' and
assert that the objector has the concept wrong.
This method of responding suggests a much more general strategy for esteeming intuition
as the highest authority in philosophy and the method on which all philosophy rests. This is what
I would call the strategy of regress, insofar as it is analogous to but not the same as the regress
argument of Aristotle above. Suppose that someone does not believe that intuition can produce
knowledge. On what basis is that belief formed? It is a priori (again, as it is a claim about
knowledge sui generis) so it is either discursively reasoned from some collection of premises and
some logical rules, or it is intuited. If it is intuited, then the owner of the belief cannot count it as
knowledge. But if it is not knowledge (and, in fact cannot become knowledge in a consistent
theory), then it does not belong to the science of knowledge, or in other words, is not a part of
philosophy (or at the very least, the philosophy with which I am concerned here). And the same
can be said for the premises and logical rules by which the deduction occurs; either they are
intuited or deduced, and if intuited, not knowledge, and consequently none of the arguments or
conclusions drawn from those premises can count as knowledge either; in particular the original
belief cannot count as knowledge. Such a claim is self-terminating because it is simultaneously
attempting to disqualify certain types of beliefs from counting as knowledge while being itself
among that type of belief. So suppose instead that someone accepts a priori means as a source of
knowledge but holds that no a priori knowledge is foundational. Again one asks on what basis
that claim is made. It is an a priori conclusion, and so must be justified through a priori means.
But any a priori argument will inevitably rely on intuition to supply its premises or rules of
inference if it is to avoid circularity. So if a priori knowledge is not foundational then the
negation of a priori as foundational cannot count as knowledge, since it would then lack a
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foundation. Again, this claim is self-terminating. Therefore there must be some foundational a
priori knowledge, i.e. intuition must be one of the types of non-inferential justifications capable
of granting knowledge.
One might imagine that this is a sufficient success for the foundationalist position, but I
would push for more. Not only is intuition foundational, but among the types of foundational
justification it serves an exalted role. First, intuition is the only way that one can acquire
foundational a priori knowledge,54 and thus philosophy, which is fundamentally an a priori
project, is ultimately beholden to intuition. Second, all knowledge, even the knowledge
non-inferentially justified by the senses, relies on intuition. This is clear when one notices that
empirical knowledge is always mediately justified via the supplication of a premise along the
lines of "sensory experience is a reliable ground for knowledge." But this is an a priori
statement, since it is about sensory experience in general, and as I have just argued, any a priori
statement must appeal to intuition as its foundation, whether immediately or ultimately. Thus
even though the senses reliably provide immediately justified knowledge, the rigorous (i.e.
philosophical) defense of this knowledge must appeal to intuition at some level. So I concur with
Fichte, and reaffirm that "intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint for all philosophy."

§ 3 Skeptical Concerns
If intuition is to serve as the foundation for philosophical knowledge it should be expected to
withstand or repel skeptical objections. Though there are many flavors of skepticism, of
particular current interest is dream skepticism and the related simulation scenarios. These
scenarios are important to consider because with advancements in technological sophistication it
seems less and less absurd to suggest that something like the "brain in a vat" is or can be made
possible. Although I will focus mostly on the dream argument (as it ostensibly the most plausible
way radical skepticism is introduced), I believe the key moves are sufficiently similar in the
simulation scenarios as well.

It is worth noting that it might be possible that one is born being aware of some true a priori propositions, or in
other words that certain a priori b eliefs are formed through memory of some innate knowledge. For Plato, all
knowledge is of this kind.
54
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The common formulation of dream skepticism simply states something like the
following: while dreaming, one experiences phenomena much like when one is awake.
Furthermore, while dreaming, one cannot (usually) determine that one is dreaming, and so
behaves and acts as if one is completely awake and conscious. Thus, it is possible that, though
one might be behaving and acting as though one is awake and conscious, that one is in fact
dreaming. Therefore any beliefs whose justification requires one's being awake are defeated. The
plausibility of dream skepticism aside, the consequences it wreaks upon knowledge are immense.
If now I am currently dreaming, then I must doubt even the veracity of my senses, and in turn the
majority of my knowledge. There are two options available should one wish to reground one's
knowledge: the first would be to assert that there are things that one can know while dreaming,
based on the dream-experiences; the second, that there are things that one can know while
dreaming, independent of any dream-experience. This subsection will demonstrate the
impossibility of the first course, then show that despite this there is a way that knowledge can be
insulated against this flavor of skepticism. But before refuting dream skepticism it is necessary to
understand precisely why it is a compelling objection. To do this I borrow from Ernest Sosa's
lecture "Dreams and Philosophy."55
Before continuing however it is worth noting that mine and Sosa's goals with respect to
the claims of the dream skeptics are different. Sosa, as a reliabilist (or virtue epistemologist)
wants to be rid of the possibility that he is dreaming, or in other words, to ascertain that he is
awake and thus in possession of knowledge of various kinds. I, on the other hand, would prefer
to secure knowledge against this possibility, or in other words, to find beliefs that are candidates
for knowledge even in the case that I am dreaming.
The theoretically important aspect of Sosa's account of dreams is his assertion that
dreaming is like imagining or fiction-telling. At the movie theater, Sosa gives as an example, one
has real audio-visual experiences but has "switched off [one's] full cognitive processing"56
through the suspension of disbelief. This action is a fundamentally epistemic action (or properly
speaking lack thereof) on the part of the movie-going subject. Analogously, while dreams do
consist of phenomenal experiences, they are not processed with the full epistemic resources of
55
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the subject. The dreamer, however, is usually unable to actively influence which epistemic
faculties he is engaging,57 and thus can neither suspend nor exercise disbelief. The conceiving of
dreams as fiction, or rather, as imaginations, allows one to apply the framework of direction to
determine that dreams are properly from-subject-toward-subject.
Sosa demonstrates the epistemic work done by this conception by supposing that he is
currently dreaming; in this dream he would then have a subjective mental activity containing the
appearance of a hand. But "even if [he] had now been dreaming, which might easily enough have
happened, [he] would not thereby have been thinking that [he] see[s] a hand, based on a
corresponding phenomenal experience."58 The

subtlety here lies in the realization that the

"corresponding phenomenal experience" that any dream-thoughts would be based on in this
scenario is not an experience of 'seeing a hand' but rather of

'imagining a hand.' The

epistemology and logic of the dream works in the same way that the epistemology and logic of a
fictional story does while conscious. There are certainly claims to be made about the
dream-experience just as there are claims to be made about the events of a fictional story;
furthermore, these claims can be true or false depending on how they are justified.59 Likewise the
characters in dreams and in fiction can have dream-beliefs or fiction-beliefs based on their
subjective mental activities. But beliefs formed by those subjects who are not characters in the
fictional story on the basis of the events of a fictional story are just that: they represent reality
only insofar as the story about which those beliefs are formed is a real story. The same is true of
beliefs formed on the basis of imaginations or dreams. For imaginations and dreams in particular,
all the content of experiences of this type is from-subject-toward-subject in the above sense.
Even though the will is not consciously involved in dreaming the mind is ultimately imposing its
own rules and logics independent of whatever occurs outside.60 As with conscious imaginations
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the sensorium is capable of informing and influencing what one experiences61 without the
direction thereby becoming from-world.
If one considers the extremal cases of the phenomena of dreaming and imagining to be
lucid dreaming and vivid daydreaming, then the mechanisms in place become more transparent.
In these cases, the subject has an awareness that the dream-experiences or imaginations are not
properly speaking his own, insofar as the subject is aware that he is lying in bed or staring out the
window. But despite this, the subject is able to process and interact with the manifold of the
dream-experience or imagination in the same way that a fictional character does in a story. The
subject thus has the phenomenal experiences of a character in his own fictions. This also explains
why one might have a dream in the third person, or imagine one is someone else entirely, as the
dream-subject is not to be identified with the subject who is dreaming. In an important sense, the
dream-subject is just as generated by the dreaming mind as all of the content which appears
before him.
There is still some room here for the objection that sensory experiences had while
unconscious can influence the content of dreams and thus provide one with some kind of
knowledge.62 To use an example from Barry Stroud, "a banging shutter might actually cause me
to dream, among other things, that a shutter is banging. If my environment affects me in that
way, and if in dreams I can be said to think or believe that something is so, would I not in that
case know that a shutter is banging?"63 The initial response to cases like this is that one is not in
possession of knowledge in this case (and in the nearby Gettier cases). Understanding dreams as
imaginations better allows one to determine precisely why no knowledge is produced here. Even
while the dream-experiences are caused by corresponding events in the waking world, the
similarities are purely coincidental; there is no necessary connection between the banging shutter
in the waking world and the one in the dream—it could just as easily have happened that the
banging shutter caused one to dream of a slamming kitchen cabinet. Furthermore, by inferring
from the dream-experiences one is inferring from appearances or presentations that are generated
by the dreaming mind, even when the mind is externally influenced. Again, even while
61
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influenced by external events, concepts, or states of affairs, the content of imaginations (and
hence of dreams) is from-subject. Thus according to the schema of re-presentationalism the
dream-presentations do not have the correct direction to grant prima facie justification and so
beliefs formed on the basis thereof will not enjoy the status of knowledge.
So in summary, according to the directional model of justification there is no way that the
sensory (or pseudo-sensory) experiences of a dream can contribute toward knowledge while
dreaming. But this still leaves open the possibility that one can have knowledge which is not
based upon the sensory dream-experiences but instead on the experience of dreaming itself.
What I have shown thus far is that most a posteriori k nowledge is defeated by dream
skepticism—that it is not possible to have empirical knowledge based on the faculties of sense if
one is really dreaming. But a priori knowledge is not like this. What distinguishes a priori
claims from a posteriori c laims (among many other things) is that they are founded upon
intuitions rather than sensations. Additionally, as discussed above, intuitions rely on
non-physical or non-empirical faculties; ones belonging wholly to the mind and not to the more
remote areas of the nervous system. Therefore if one can establish that the mind is as capable of
intuiting certain propositions while dreaming as it is while awake, then one will have
safeguarded those propositions against the dream skeptics.
The most plausible candidate for such a protected proposition is "experience is
occurring." Whenever this proposition appears before the mind it is necessarily true, since its
appearance before the mind is itself an experience. Thus if one intuits this proposition, whether
one is asleep in a dream or awake and completely lucid, it will grant justification for the belief
that experience is occurring, and thus one will have knowledge that experience is occurring. To
counteract any potential objectors who would maintain that, during a dream, the 'experiences' of
seeing, hearing, &c. are not true experiences but rather only imaginations thereof, one can
modify the proposition to "intellectual experience is occurring" in order to weaken it. Even if
there is no sensory experience taking place, or if what appears as sensory experience is not in
actuality, one will still remain in possession of the knowledge that intellectual experience is
occurring.
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Intellectual experience is insulated in this way for two reasons. First, it is possible while
dreaming to have a bona fide intellectual experience (e.g. an intuition) because the requisite
faculties are all operational to the extent required for intellectual experience to occur. The fact
that intuition is purely cognitive means that, unlike the physical senses, it is prima facie r eliable
whenever cognitive activity is occuring. Therefore even though all of the empirical senses are
completely unreliable during a dream, and the sights and sounds of the dream cannot justify
beliefs about the external world, intuition can. This is another reason why the realist response to
the objection of subjectivity is attractive.64
Second, the act of imagination is itself an intellectual experience. Therefore even an
imagination of the proposition "intellectual experience is occuring" will result in a sufficient
justification for the belief that intellectual experience is occurring to count as knowledge. This is
an echo of the classic "I think, therefore I am"65 of Descartes. A charitable reformulation of the
argument implied by this phrase is as follows: the subject is a necessary precondition for thought
to take place. Therefore if thought is taking place, the subject must exist. Thus the proposition "I
think, therefore I am" is true of necessity whenever it appears before the mind. So, according to
Descartes one is always justified in believing that one exists if one is thinking. Likewise if the
proposition "intellectual experience is occuring" appears before the mind, whether it is intuited
or imagined it becomes true of necessity. But if an imagination of the proposition "intellectual
experience is occuring" can guarantee that intellectual experience is occuring, then as I have just
argued, it is possible to have intuitions and thus to possess knowledge based on those intuitions.
So at the very least, the worst case of the skeptical scenario is avoided. Not only is
knowledge possible, but it is further possible to defeat the skeptical scenario itself. An intuition
to the effect of "this is not a dream-scenario" (or similarly, "this is not the brain-in-a-vat
scenario," or any other scenario-defeating intuition) is capable of giving to its corresponding
belief status as knowledge. Of course, this belief can be defeated by questions about the quality

64

The idealist response to the objection of subjectivity is attractive not as a way to refute the skeptical concerns, but
to subvert them instead. By making irrelevant investigations into the 'reality' of the content given by the empirical
senses the dream scenario is less worrisome for the idealist. There are obviously other problems, like that of other
minds, that the idealist must find a way to solve but as idealism is not in the height of its fashion I leave this
discussion for a later date.
65
Descartes, op. cit. p. 18.
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or reliability of the intuition, but consider the belief to the contrary: is it really more likely that an
intuition about the dream-scenario is true than one about the veracity of one's experience? Of
course, to frame these questions in issues of probability is far from the purpose of the present
investigation. On the other hand, to ask whether one can reasonably doubt that this is not real,
given what I perceive as manifold intellectual and sensory reassurances that it is, is completely
justified. Most skeptical scenarios are manifest not by one's having an intuition that they are the
case, but are brought about in a speculative register, a qualified or hypothetical domain which
does not seriously compel one to cognize the world as false, and one's knowledge as unreliable.
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